tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14261952.post1096242414172105618..comments2024-03-25T13:40:30.747-04:00Comments on Faith and Theology: Metaphysics and the God of Israel: Neil MacDonald repliesBen Myershttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03800127501735910966noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14261952.post-86069411203035439292008-02-21T03:08:00.000-05:002008-02-21T03:08:00.000-05:00Excellent - thanks for posting this!Excellent - thanks for posting this!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14261952.post-19464044132952498192008-02-20T16:18:00.000-05:002008-02-20T16:18:00.000-05:00Thank you for this reply, Prof. MacDonald. The who...Thank you for this reply, Prof. MacDonald. The whole discussion of your book has been very helpful.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14261952.post-42638477274643330772008-02-20T11:53:00.000-05:002008-02-20T11:53:00.000-05:00Divine self-determination is basic and sufficient ...<I>Divine self-determination is basic and sufficient in itself for the truth of God creating the world. </I>This means that divine self-divine determination can take place in such a way that [it?] renders natural theology false <I>(and therefore conditionally impossible as it were – in the world in which we live). I put it this way in the book:</I><BR/><BR/>I'm not sure how this follows. I realize that you've written a whole book on this topic, so a blog post might not contain the whole argument (and I haven't read the book, so perhaps I'm missing something important).<BR/><BR/>Nevertheless, let me try to recast things a bit to see if I understand the structure of your argument. It seems to me that you are making the following claims:<BR/><BR/>1. God's decision to become a creator is a sufficient condition to cause him to create the world.<BR/>2. Natural theology is false because of (1).<BR/><BR/>Now as it stands, I don't see the connection between (1) and (2). I take it that there are some hidden premises here that are spelled out more fully in the book itself, such as,<BR/><BR/>3. Natural theology is possible if and only if there is some likeness between the creature and the creature.<BR/><BR/>(3) seems like a plausible enough principle-if God were wholly and absolutely other than us, then he is probably unknowable. But if he is unknowable, natural theology is false, therefore for natural theology to be true, he cannot be absolutely other.<BR/><BR/>I don't think the conjunction of (1) and (3) are enough yet to warrant the conclusion (2). <BR/><BR/>After all, typically, advocates of natural theology would agree to (3), and they would want to say that in fact the condition is fulfilled: there is a likeness between God and creatures. I take that they want to ground that likeness between creature and creator in the act of creation, following Aristotle's dictum that all effects imitate their cause somehow.<BR/><BR/>I take it that you want to show that Aristotle's dictum can be false: <BR/><BR/>(4) God's self-determining decision causes creation, but in such a way that does not entail any likeness between Creator and creature.<BR/><BR/>Now the conjunction of (3), (4) and (1) would seem to prove (2). For if God creates by a decision that does not entail likeness between God and a creature but natural theology requires such a likeness, then God's creating by such decision does render natural theology impossible.<BR/><BR/>Does this seem to have framed your argument fairly? If so, then I would like to ask what support you would have for (4). There might be problems with the other premises as well, but (4) is the one I find most worrisome.Shanehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14594090275917087869noreply@blogger.com